To understand low fertility in Asian countries we need to understand the changing economic and social conditions in these countries and the way they influence the perceived desirability and feasibility of building a family. The focus is typically on the pressures on married couples, with insufficient attention given to the factors influencing whether people marry in the first place. It is important to understand the reasons behind the marriage trends because marriage is essentially the gatekeeper to childbirth in these societies, with fewer than 2 % of children born outside marriage (Frejka et al. 2010, fn. 10).² And in all of these countries, singlehood has been sharply rising over the period of declining and low fertility. It has been estimated that in Singapore over the period 1990–2005, declines in proportions married were responsible for one-third of the decline to ultra-low levels of fertility (Koh 2011).

Figure 3.2 illustrates the rising trend of singlehood at ages 30–34. The trend in this age group is consistent with evidence for other age groups (e.g., 35–39) and with the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM). Singapore stands out from the other countries in that while its proportion of singles has been increasing, the rise has been much more modest than in South Korea or Taiwan. In 2010, Singapore had the lowest proportion of singles among these countries, for both women and men—a notable reversal of the situation two decades earlier. At ages 30–34, the proportion of single women in Singapore was 25.1 % while the proportion of single men was 37.1 %. Hong Kong and Taiwan are leading the trend in rising singlehood for both men and women. Both South Korea and Taiwan experienced a rapid increase within the 10 years from 2000 to 2010.

In order to assess the likely impact of pro-natalist policies, it is necessary to understand the reasons why fertility has reached such a low level. There is a considerable literature on this,³ which we will not attempt to summarize in detail here, but we will simply note what appear to be the key reasons in the countries under discussion. These countries are consumerist societies, stressing achievement and upward social mobility above all else (see Chang 2010 on South Korea). They are vastly wealthier than they were four or five decades ago, when parents routinely had four or five children. Nowadays, paradoxically, many feel a sense of relative deprivation, which means that aspirations can only be met by both parents working. The financial and opportunity costs of raising children are considerable, particularly as parents face enormous pressure for their children to succeed in education. In this competitive education “arms race,” in the context of limited parental time and financial resources, the “quality/quantity trade-off” comes down heavily in favor of quality.

Strong familism and patriarchy characterize these societies. Economic development and social modernization clash with traditionalism in the household. As a result, women face conflicting roles in balancing work and family life. Access to childcare services is limited, and working women face the tradition of long working hours and a work environment often unfriendly to the need for flexible hours and childcare leave. These are highly urbanized societies, with long travel times to work coupled with limited and expensive housing to meet the needs of larger families.

Given the many dilemmas that are part and parcel of marrying in these societies (the notion of a “marriage package,” as described by Bumpass and colleagues (2009) in Japan, is equally relevant here), it is small wonder that there is increasingly later and less marriage. Aside from volitional reasons, non-volitional factors are also operating, including the inadequate replacement of traditional matchmaking systems, and continued hypergamy and homogamy, leading to a marriage squeeze for certain groups. The combination of a rise in age at marriage, a situation where 15 % of women will be permanently removed from the reproductive population by non-marriage (probably within 10 years), and continuing high levels of divorce bodes ill for any substantial rise in fertility. Furthermore, there is little indication of a trend toward more cohabitation, and even less so of acceptance of childbearing in cohabiting relationships—trends that have propped up fertility rates in many Western countries.

Singapore achieved self-government in 1957, entered the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, but left the Federation to become a separate, independent state in 1965. Facing very high fertility levels combined with uncertainties about the political and economic future of what was considered an over-populated island, the government introduced a national population-control program, passing the Singapore Family Planning and Population Act in 1965 and establishing the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board in 1966. A series of anti-natalist measures were introduced, including the Voluntary Sterilization Act in 1969, as well as a set of incentives and disincentives to encourage small families in 1972. Some of the measures introduced and implemented during the anti-natalist period included the reduction of income tax relief to cover only three children, lowering of priority for primary school admission for fourth-order and above children, elimination of the housing subsidy for large families, and limitation of paid maternity leave to first and second births (Sun 2012, p. 63).

The pace of fertility decline that followed was one of the most rapid in the world. It was widely attributed to the anti-natalist policies, although many other factors were clearly involved. Although Singapore’s fertility reached replacement level in 1975, the anti-natalist policies were kept in place until 1983. Then in 1984, the state implemented selective pro-natalist policies, described as the “eugenic phase” of Singapore’s population policy. Educated women were given incentives to reproduce under the “Graduate Mother Scheme,” while sterilization cash incentives were offered to less educated women (Straughan et al. 2009, p. 184; Saw 2005, p. 212). These policies proved to be very unpopular with broad sections of the public. They were abandoned in 1985, followed by the closure of the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board in 1986. The following year (1987), the fertility policy in Singapore took on a broadly pro-natalist stance, with the introduction of both slogans and policies to support having three or more children based on affordability. This stance has shaped Singapore’s fertility policy until the present, with various policies to increase fertility introduced and strengthened over the years.

There was an interval of 15 years between the time fertility first dipped below replacement level and the introduction of pro-natalist policies directed at the population as a whole. As the pioneer in fertility decline in the region, with a history of strong and effective anti-natalist policies, it is perhaps not surprising that there was hesitation to reverse these policies until it was clear that no resurgence in fertility was likely. The subsequent history of policy reversals in other Asian countries shows that Singapore was no exception in delaying its policy reversal (see Table 3.1).

Policies emphasizing larger families and early family formation were implemented during the late 1980s to the late 1990s. Some of the measures and incentives that were introduced included subsidized childcare, tax rebates for third children, and public housing schemes encouraging early family formation and larger families, such as the Fiancé/ Fiancée Scheme, the Parenthood Priority Scheme, and other schemes for first-time married couples.

Then, in 2000, the government introduced a number of new policies and revisions. Importantly, the Baby Bonus Scheme was introduced. This two-tiered system involved distribution of cash benefits on the birth of second and third children. It also included a co-savings arrangement set up by the government, which was payable over a 6-year period, with maximum contributions capped at S$6,000 for the second child and S$12,000 for the third child.⁴ This co-saving could be used for all children. Tax rebates, which were offered only to the third child in 1987 and to the third and fourth child in 1989, were extended to include the second child. Singapore’s total fertility rate (TFR) continued to decline from 2001 to 2003, however, despite the introduction of these and a variety of other incentives aimed at encouraging marriage and childbearing. The TFR fell from 1.61 children per woman in 1997 to 1.25 in 2003.⁵

In 2004, the Baby Bonus Scheme was extended to include the birth of first and fourth children, when S$3,000 and S$6,000 were given to parents. This cash gift was distributed in five instalments over an 18-month period as opposed to over 6 years previously. In 2008, the payout to first and second children was raised from S$3,000 to S$4,000.

Since 2003, Singapore’s TFR has stayed in the 1.2 region, with minor changes until 2010, when it fell slightly lower to 1.16. This could be because 2010 was a Year of the Tiger, which is considered to be inauspicious for birth in the Chinese zodiac cycle. In the following year, the rate rose marginally to 1.20 and in 2012—a Year of the Dragon—it went up to 1.29 (see Fig. 3.1).

Policies were further boosted in January 2013 in the form of a Marriage and Parenthood Package, aimed at helping Singaporeans “to form families and raise children” (NPTD 2013a). This enhanced package includes giving priority in the assignment of a first-time public-housing apartment to couples who have children. It also includes enhancing Co-Funding for Assisted Reproduction Technology (ART) Treatment, waiving accouchement fees in public hospitals to all mothers irrespective of the birth order of the child, extending paid childcare leave, and introducing paid adoption leave, 1 week paid paternity leave, and shared parental leave (see Appendix for details of policy enhancements).

McDonald (2002), citing Heitlinger (1991), categorized fertility policies under:

Policies to influence marriage are not specifically included here. Although marriage is affected by fertility desires,⁶ thus being affected by all the above elements of fertility policy, there are other factors influencing whether people marry. One way to think of factors affecting marriage is to divide reasons for not marrying into volitional and non-volitional categories. Singapore has had specific policies to influence marriage, and the government clearly considers marriage policy important in its armory of policies to influence fertility. Marriage policies will therefore be included as a fourth type of pro-natalist policy.

It is interesting to take a cross-sectional snapshot of fertility policies in the region as of 1995. Keep in mind that fertility rates in 1995 were well below replacement level in Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan and at ultra-low levels (TFR below 1.5) in Japan. Singapore had begun promoting the formation of families in 1987, and by 1995 Singapore had more pro-natalist policies in place than the other countries. In fact, it had been 8 years since the Singapore government had introduced income-tax relief, tax rebates, childcare subsidies, and housing subsidies for larger families. By the early 1990s, housing incentives to encourage early family formation included HDB’s Fiancé/Fiancée Scheme, under which couples intending to marry could register for an apartment together and marry within 3 months of taking possession. This scheme aimed to enable couples to have a ready home upon marriage. In 1990, the Domestic Worker Levy Relief was introduced to encourage working mothers to continue working while having someone to take care of their child. Despite all these pro-family and pro-fertility measures, however, fertility continued to decline.

Both Taiwan and South Korea reached replacement level fertility in 1984 but by 1995 had no pro-natalist policies in place. The Taiwanese government had made a pro-natalist statement but had not introduced any concrete measures. It was only in 2006 that both Taiwan and South Korea implemented their respective pro-natalist policies.

The South Korean government was very slow to reverse its anti-natalist policies. In 2002, the Noh Mu-Hyeon government took a step toward initiating pro-natalist policies, but it took a few more years for the policies to actually be implemented. At this time, South Korea’s TFR was the lowest in the world, declining in 2005 to 1.08 (Lee 2009, p. 57). It was only in 2006, however, that the South Korean government announced an integrated package, the “Saeromaji Plan 2010,” which comprised a variety of pro-natalist measures (Suzuki 2008, p. 37). These measures included tax rebates, expansion of maternity and childcare leave, and improvement of childcare services. South Korea was not able to offer a universal child allowance, however, due to budget constraints.

Taiwan’s TFR started declining gradually from 1995, but in the 1998 Year of the Tiger, it declined drastically—to 1.47 from 1.77 in 1997. Beside the Year of Tiger being inauspicious for birth, the financial crisis of 1997 also contributed to this decline. In the following 2 years, the TFR rose slightly, then declined sharply again in 2001, to 1.40 from 1.68 in 2000. Following this decline, Taiwan’s TFR has declined consistently, with the exception of the years 2005–2007 when it remained at 1.12. In the 2010 Year of the Tiger, Taiwan’s TFR plunged to 0.89, probably the lowest level of fertility ever reached in any country with a population in excess of ten million. As in South Korea, Taiwan had no pro-natalist policies until 2006, when measures such as maternity and parental leave and a childcare subsidy system were introduced under the “Mega Warmth Social Welfare Program” (Freijka et al. 2010, p. 599). This was followed by the 2008 White Book of Population Policy. Since the introduction of these measures, the TFR has yet to increase significantly, although the increase to 1.26 in the 2012 Year of the Dragon raises hope that the inevitable subsequent decline will still leave fertility somewhat higher than it was before.

Clearly Singapore was a little faster than Taiwan or South Korea in reacting to a fertility decline and beginning to reverse its anti-natalist policies. But now that both South Korea and Taiwan have had pro-natalist measures in place for some years, it is worth comparing the similarities and differences between their policies, those of Japan, and those of Singapore. Singapore’s policy of financial incentives has been expanded over time and now is clearly the most comprehensive among the four countries. On the birth of a child, Japan offers a cash payment of 10,000 yen (roughly US$100) monthly until the child turns three. The Japanese government does not offer large tax deductions for children, however (Frejka et al. 2010, p. 598). Neither Taiwan nor South Korea offers cash payments, the former due to feminist protests and the latter due to budgetary constraints, although South Korea has lower taxes for large families or families with young children.